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Abstract
Collaborative forest management (CFM) is a ‘community-based’ forest tenure regime that works 
in partnership between the central government, local government and local forest user groups 
in Nepal’s Terai, particularly in the management of large, contiguous forests. It has been in 
practice since the early 2000s in the form of ‘pilot initiatives’ and is gradually receiving greater 
legal attention. Through our own experiences, available literature and review of policies, we 
document the evolutionary history of Terai forest and CFM’s current issues. We found that the 
management aspects of Terai forests have been weak throughout its history. We also found a 
number of issues and challenges in the implementation of CFM. Some of the prominent issues 
include ambiguity in tenure rights and security, lack of appropriate and uncontested policy 
provisions for cost and benefit sharing among collaborators, limited decision-making space for 
forest-managing communities and local governments, and limited capacity of collaborators for 
the productive management of forests. We suggest tenure reform in terms of legal, institutional, 
technical and financial arrangements, so as to make CFM an effective forest management model 
in the Terai. 
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INTRODUCTION
Collaborative forest management (CFM) 
is a forest tenure regime that works 
in partnership between the central 
government, local government and 
local forest user groups in Nepal. While 
community forestry (CF) was gaining 
momentum in the hills in the early 2000s, 
Nepalese government introduced the 
concept of CFM for the management 
of state-controlled forests in Terai. The 
major purpose of CFM is to manage large 
contiguous forests in Terai for multiple 
benefits, such as timber production, revenue 
generation, coordination among various 
actors and inclusion of distant households 
in forest resource governance through 
collaborative efforts of multiple actors 
(GoN 2016). Initially, CFM was backed 
by the revised Forestry Sector Policy of 
2000 and initiated in the form of ‘pilot 
projects’. Gradually, the Government of 
Nepal (GoN) has put tremendous efforts, 
including legal provisioning, institutional 
arrangement, and programmatic support 
into this regime. The second amendment 
of the Forest Act 1993 legalised the CFM in 
2016, which provisioned the establishment 
of the District Forest Sector Coordination 
Committee (DFSCC), Collaborative 
Forest Management Group (CFMG) and 
Program Management Committee (PMC). 
Virtually, the District Forest Office (DFO) 
controls these institutions. 
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While the government-managed, national 
forests are rearranged in the form of 
CFM, a major question is: to what extent 
has the forest tenure been improved in 
reality from the perspectives of CFMG 
and the local government? To answer this 
question, we examine CFM processes and 
ramifications through historical transect, 
political economy of tenure reform, and 
attendant governance issues. We assume 
that these three premises are crucial 
to shape the outcomes and deliveries 
of forestry governance, including 
sustainability of forest ecosystems, 
optimum forest benefits and equitable 
sharing of rights and resources (Pagdee 
et al. 2006). Pivotal to these premises is 
the tenure arrangement of any forest 
management regime (Anderson 2012). 
As forest tenure cannot be understood in 
vacuum, we need to be clear on two basic 
questions: whose tenure and for what 
purposes (Jhaveri and Adhikari 2015), 
while debating about forest tenure. We 
build our argument on the basis that the 
tenure should support the objectives of the 
forest-managing individuals or groups. In 
CFM, it is therefore necessary to examine 
the tenure implications on three major 
actors: the central government, the local 
government and the local communities. 
While the tenure arrangement for the 
central government is clear, it is complex 
and contested in the case of CFMG 
and local government. The concept of 
tenure in the context of CFM should be 
situated and assessed through the lens of 
CFMG and local government, as they are 
supposedly assigned and delegated with 
the authority and responsibility for forest 
management by the central government. 
In order to examine the tenure contexts, 
processes and outcomes of CFM, this paper 
highlights how and why CFM emerged in 
Terai, and explores its political economy 
as well as several issues associated with 
its implementation, particularly tenure 
security and rights of local government 
and communities over forest management, 
decision-making and distribution of 
benefits accrued from forest resources.
The paper is structured as follows. 
Following the introduction, section 2 
provides a brief overview of the contexts 
for emergence and evolution of CFM. 
Section 3 examines the political economy 
of forest governance reform and CFM 
contestations by assessing various 
interrelated components, including the 
issues related to the bundle of rights and 
tenure security. Section 4 discusses key 
issues and challenges associated with the 
implementation of CFM. Finally, the 
paper is concluded with some possible 
ways forward. 
EMERGENCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF CFM IN 
NEPAL: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Experiences show that, throughout the 
modern history of Nepal, there has always 
been a tension between the local people 
and the state in relation to controlling 
the local forest resources (Regmi 1978). 
In particular, contestations over access, 
use and control of forest resources have 
featured more prominently in the Terai’s 
history (e.g., Satyal and Humphreys 2013; 
Satyal 2004, 2010). Lately, dominant 
discourses on Terai forestry have been 
based on conceptualisation of different pilot 
models but without proper development 
and implementation. As Schoubroeck and 
Karna (2003) highlighted, different models 
of Terai forest management (e.g. parks, 
community forestry, scientific forestry) 
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were designed and proposed as promising 
management modalities but failed to 
address the problems of deforestation.
The forest conservation and management 
in Terai has been more challenging 
compared to rest of Nepal. Despite 
the implementation of different forest 
management modalities in Terai for the 
last fifty years, net deforestation and forest 
degradation continues (DFRS 2015). For 
instance, more than 75,000 hectares (ha) 
of Terai forests was illegally encroached 
from 1990 to 2001 (DoF 2005). A number 
of factors such as large-sized high-value 
forests, uneven pattern of forest resource 
and population distribution, high 
migration from across the border from 
India and Nepalese hills, increased user 
group heterogeneity (indigenous Tharus, 
Madhesis and hill-origin people) resulting 
into ethnic tensions (in recent years), 
issues of proximate and distant users, and 
continued illegal logging and cross-border 
smuggling engender challenges in the 
management of forests in the Terai (Satyal 
2004, 2010; Satyal and Humphreys 2013). 
An increasing rate of deforestation and 
forest degradation remains unabated 
in Terai despite the implementation of 
CF, which has had positive outcomes in 
terms of halting deforestation and forest 
degradation in the hills (DFRS 2015; 
REDD-IC 2017). To address this problem, 
in mid-1990s, the government attempted to 
manage Terai forests by endorsing district 
level Operational Forest Management 
Plans (OFMPs) across the Terai districts; 
but these plans were never implemented 
(Dhungana 2007). Baral (2002) reported 
that forest management plans were never 
implemented fully despite the fact that 
they were prepared and institutionalised 
from the 1970s.
Nepalese government introduced 
revised forestry sector policy through a 
cabinet decision in May 2000 (HMGN 
2000) to address the increasing rate of 
deforestation and forest degradation 
in Terai. Special feature of this policy 
was the introduction of an alternative 
model for block forest management to 
increase forest productivity by adopting 
appropriate silvicultural system, fulfill the 
growing needs of forest products, conserve 
biodiversity and generate employment 
(Bampton et al. 2007; Bhatta et al. 2007). 
For the effective implementation of the 
policy, government also endorsed the 
CFM Directives, 2003 (MoFSC 2003) 
and established CFM as pilot initiatives 
in Bara, Parsa and Rautahat districts 
through a Dutch-funded Biodiversity 
Sector Programme for Siwaliks and Terai 
(BISEP-ST). Based on the learnings and 
experiences from the pilot program (2001-
2006) the government formally launched 
and expanded CFM. In 2011, a revision 
was made to the CFM Directives 2003, 
which provides guidance on the procedural 
aspect of CFM in the region (Mandal and 
Bhattarai 2014). Likewise, Forest Policy 
2015 and Forestry Sector Strategy 2016 
have elaborated the community access to 
and control over forest resources in the 
Terai (MoFSC 2015). These policies, along 
with the most recent (in 2016) amendments 
of the Forest Act 1993 provides legal basis 
for the development and implementation 
of CFM, including legal recognition of 
CFM stakeholders. However, CFM is yet 
to be included in Forest Regulations 1995 
that guides the governance of the tenure 
regime in detail. 
Currently, CFM has been practiced in 11 
districts of the Terai: Morang, Dhanusha, 
Sarlahi, Mahottari, Rautahat, Bara, Parsa, 
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Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Kapilvastu, 
and Kailali. Till now, there are 26 CFM 
groups that have been formed across these 
Terai districts and are managing around 
67,000 ha of national forests under the 
CFM regime (DoF 2016). The users of 
a single CFMG are distributed across 
several villages, and more than 8.5 million 
households have been benefitted from 
CFM implementation in the Terai (DoF 
2016).
Theoretically, CFM is loosely defined as 
a ‘working partnership between the key 
stakeholders in the management of a given 
forest - key stakeholders being local forest 
users and state forest departments, as 
well as parties such as local governments, 
civic groups and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and the private 
sector’ (Carter and Gronow 2005: 2). 
In that sense, CFM is conceptually an 
inclusive approach in its design in terms 
of stakeholder engagement in forest 
management. However, the CFM debate 
is highly polarised in Nepal and different 
stakeholders hold diverse views, which we 
elaborate in the next section. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
FOREST GOVERNANCE 
REFORM AND CFM 
CONTESTATIONS
In order to understand the evolution 
and development of CFM in Terai, it 
is important to look into the political 
economy of forestry policy reform in 
the country, linking it with the historical 
contexts of forest governance and tenure 
issues, institutional arrangements, and 
the relationships between the key actors 
(including the dynamics of contestations). 
This section provides an analysis of forestry 
sector reform in relation to Nepal’s socio-
political and historical contexts, focusing 
on the impacts of Terai forestry on 
forest governance, tenure security and 
contestations between different actors. 
Bundle of Rights and Tenure 
Security 
Forest tenure can be regarded as ‘a bundle 
of rights’, including rights and specific 
benefits derived from forests (access, 
withdrawal and benefits), management 
(overall decision-making including rights 
of exclusion), and alienation (ownership, 
right to compensation, right to sale) 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992; REDD-IC 
2016). Debates on forest people’s bundle 
of rights are therefore related to land 
rights (tenure), use rights, and rights to 
manage or protect and conserve (Springate-
Baginski and Blaikie 2007; Sikor et al. 
2010). These rights include both individual 
rights to be cultivated land in forestland 
and collective or community rights over 
common property resources. Besides the 
substantive rights (such as to life, personal 
security, health, adequate standard of 
living, education), forest peoples’ rights 
are also related to undoing the ‘historic 
injustice’ done to them (Sikor 2014). 
Historically, state ownership and control 
of forests and their management through 
centralised forest departments worldwide 
have resulted in the consolidation of power 
over forests and forest-dependent people 
by the state, forest bureaucracy or local 
elites. Past interventions through state-
controlled forest decision-making had also 
seriously eroded tenure security, as they 
restricted local communities’ access to and 
control over forestlands. 
While applying the concepts of bundle 
of rights and tenure security in the 
contemporary forest management 
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modalities, issues of forest rights relates 
to the role of the state, policy provisions, 
nature of forest administration, and 
decision-making processes. To understand 
the forest rights and tenure security, 
one should know the policy provisions, 
and state’s roles and practices in relation 
to contestations of interests, values 
and power among a variety of actors 
competing for access to and control over 
resources. Ideas on forest rights and tenure 
security therefore need to be understood 
in the context of constantly articulated, re-
articulated and transformed forest politics 
and policies in response to wider changes 
in the political, economic, social and 
natural environments (Satyal 2006, 2010; 
Satyal and Humphreys 2013).
If we look into the history of forest 
governance in Nepal, the state’s approach 
to the management of land and forest 
resources of Terai has shifted several times 
in history: as a maintenance of forested 
barrier against potential British invasion 
(until 1816); the appropriation of forest 
land by the state as part of economic and 
political-bureaucratic expansion (until 
1951); followed by the nationalisation of 
private forests and lands (1957); partial 
decentralisation of forest governance 
(since the late 1980s); development of 
community-based forest management 
(CBFM), including CF (late 1980s) and 
CFM (late 1990s); and emergence of 
forestry projects based on carbon and 
payment for environmental services (since 
2010). These changes in forestry policies 
and practices had different impacts in 
terms of communities’ forest rights and 
tenure issues. 
Despite the changing policy and practice, 
a closer look into the political economy 
of Nepal from a historical perspective 
suggests that only a few ruling elites at the 
centre, and local elites created thereafter as 
a result of the autocratic political system 
and feudal social structure, were allowed to 
benefit from the Terai forests (Satyal 2006, 
2010). For example, Nepal’s forestry sector 
was historically an inequitable domain 
that benefited the state and the ruling elites 
whereas common people did not get a fair 
share of benefits. This resulted in loss of 
local people’s entitlements to land and 
forests. Upper-hand of the Nepali state in 
forest control meant that revenues from 
forests were used to consolidate power 
and position during the Shahs (post-1768), 
Ranas (1846-1951) and Panchayati system 
(1960-1990) (Satyal 2006, 2010; Satyal and 
Humphreys 2013). In the early 1980s, 
decentralisation of forest governance 
initiated with recognition of community 
ownership and management of forests, 
mainly through the development of CF 
in the hills that continued till date. CBFM 
has become a popular policy idea in Nepal 
(Gilmour and Fisher 1991), with expansion 
of its variants in the form of buffer zone 
management (outside protected areas) and 
CFM in the Terai. 
Amid the challenges of historical legacy 
of state control of Terai forests, volatile 
politics and continued transition, CBFM 
has evolved as one of the major components 
of Nepal’s forest development strategy in 
Nepal (Acharya 2002). However, progress 
in implementation of CBFM (CF or CFM) 
in the Terai has been very slow. Similarly, 
the historical legacy of the state in forest 
politics and policy, the superseding of local 
subsistence needs by national commercial 
interests and resistance to change in the 
forest bureaucracy with its tacit support 
for the status quo in Terai forestry, also 
hindered forest governance reforms for 
years. Such hindrances not only increased 
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the mismanagement and corruption in 
the forestry sector but also promoted 
illegal logging, deforestation and forest 
degradation in the region. 
Terai forest management problems are 
in contrast to the successful experience 
of CF in the mid-hills (Satyal 2004). 
Among others, increasing forest-related 
contestations, particularly between the 
state, local people and various other 
stakeholders over the control, management 
and use of forests has been one of the 
reasons for this (Bampton et al. 2007). 
While an attempt by the government 
to bring Terai forests under alternative 
management plans (such as the CFM) has 
been favoured by some (e.g. distant users, 
local governments, some donor agencies), 
it has faced strong oppositions from the CF 
lobby. Forest management policies in the 
Terai have been a complex, and politically 
controversial issue in Nepal. While the 
civil society groups such as the influential 
Federation of Community Forestry Users 
Nepal (FECOFUN), which represents 
more than 19,000 community forest user 
groups (CFUGs) across the country, 
want the expansion of CF regime in the 
Terai, the government wants to advance 
the development and implementation 
of CFM. Lately, CFM groups have also 
been federating themselves to form the 
Association of Collaborative Forest Users 
Nepal (ACOFUN) and have been pushing 
the agenda of CFM implementation in 
the Terai. The multilateral and bilateral 
donors active in Terai forests were also 
divided during CFM initiation: some 
directly or indirectly supporting CF (e.g. 
USAID, GIZ and DANIDA), whereas 
others (e.g. Dutch) supporting CFM 
(Satyal and Humphreys 2013).  
Social Inclusion and Distant Users 
in the CFM Debate
The issue of distant users has been central 
in contemporary debates on how Terai 
forests should be managed (as evident in 
the polarised arguments between the two 
dominant policy models of CF and CFM) 
(Satyal 2004, 2010; Satyal and Humphreys 
2013). Arguing that the CF regime as 
demanded by the forest user groups and the 
FECOFUN, favours only the proximate 
users at the expense of the distant users, 
the GoN has been advocating CFM which, 
it argues, could address equity issues with 
more proportionate distribution of benefits 
to all users, including the distant ones. 
The rising political struggles by various 
Madhesi and Tharu groups and rising 
ethnic tension, particularly after 2006 
have further politicised these debates, with 
Pahadis (hill-origin people) supporting CF 
and Madhesis favouring the CFM.
The CFM seeks to develop, albeit in abstract 
forms, appropriate mechanisms for sharing 
rights, responsibilities and benefits with 
‘considerations of social, gender and ethnic 
equity’ and ‘mechanisms for distribution 
and marketing of forest products’ (MoFSC 
2003; Mandal 2007). It is envisioned 
with an idea that everyone should have 
a stake in national forests; it considers 
national government, local government 
and local users as the main stakeholders 
(See tenure arrangements and bundle of 
rights under CFM in Table 1). While the 
CFM plan seeks to distribute revenues 
collected from Terai forests at different 
levels (among the central government, 
local government and local users), as the 
CF lobby argues, considerations of more 
powerful stakeholders (i.e. national and 
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local governments) in the claim of benefits 
make the sharing of income and forest 
products to the local users less fair in 
comparison to the provisions under CF 
regimes. In CFM, forest products such 
as timber and fuelwood are distributed 
between the national government (40%) 
and local government (10%) and local 
users (50%). Although the CFM regime 
sets aside priority for the fulfillment of 
forest product needs of the users involved, 
the rights over use of forest products are 
limited to only fodder, lops and tops, 
and small woods (which are not always 
free of charge) (MoFSC 2003). Although 
CFM is practicing distribution of 50 per 
cent of the shared timber among their 
members, the supply is not sufficient to 
meet the demand. Additionally, due to 
the reduced income available in the users’ 
fund and a large number of households 
involved (e.g., 33,000 in Sabaiya of Parsa 
district) and, hence, reduced opportunities 
for involvement and participation of 
users in the decision-making process, 
the implementation of CFM has 
experienced oppositions and contestations 
from the CF lobby. Although local 
government bodies (e.g., the then District 
Development Committees - DDC and 
Village Development Committees - VDC) 
and Collaborative Forest Management 
Committees (CFMC) can participate in 
the political processes by which forest 
management decisions are made, large 
number of people involved can make the 
participatory process limited to a mere 
ritual controlled by an influential few.
Table 1: Tenure Arrangements, Bundle of Rights and Right Holders in CFM (adapted from 
REDD-IC 2017)
Bundle of 
rights
State/ government Community/ 
user group
Household/ 
individual
Indigenous 
groups and 
other forest 
people
Access and 
benefit
(use right)
Tenure is 
unlimited, 50% 
benefits from 
the forest (forest 
product - especially 
timber and 
firewood) go to the 
state. According 
to the revised 
provisions on 
Forest Act, 40% 
of income gained 
from the sale of 
forest products 
goes to the national 
government, 
10% to local 
government, and 
50% to the local 
communities. 
The communities 
are granted access 
and withdrawal 
rights.  Local 
government and 
communities 
get 60% of 
the harvested 
products 
(firewood and 
timber) not the 
revenue.
Little space 
for individuals 
and household 
members to 
determine 
benefit sharing 
modality.
Indigenous 
peoples and 
other groups are 
not explicitly 
recognised, 
however there 
is a provision 
to include them 
in CFM group 
and committee 
(according to 
CFM Directives).
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Management
(control right)
Approve 
management 
plan and forest is 
managed through 
an annual scheme 
or 5-10 year plan.
Involvement 
of both nearby 
and distant 
forest users, and 
is coordinated 
through the 
DFSCC (mainly 
in the approval 
phase of the 
management 
plan) dominated 
by the DFO.
Individuals 
and household 
members 
involved in 
planning but 
they have 
little voice in 
how CFM 
areas are to be 
managed.
Indigenous 
peoples and 
other groups are 
not explicitly 
recognised 
(they have to be 
consulted during 
the preparation 
of management 
plan but it is 
not always 
practiced).
Alienation
(transfer right)
Revoke rights, can 
change land use.
NA NA NA
Policy Reform and Contested 
Views of Actors on CFM
The other major question to explore 
is: what implications the major policy 
processes and outcomes, including the 
revised Forestry Sector Policy 2000, 
amendments to the Nepal’s Forest Act 
1993, CFM Directives 2011, Forestry 
Sector Strategy 2016 and Forest Policy 
2015 have in terms of the opportunities 
and challenges of implementing CFM? As 
argued earlier, CFM was first introduced 
through a provision in the revised Forestry 
Sector Policy 2000 that envisioned CFM 
as an alternative to the dominant regime 
of CF, including the distribution of 
benefits and revenues between the central 
government, local government and local 
users. The revised Forest Policy of 2000 
also aimed to resolve the critical issue 
of inclusion of distant users, which the 
community forestry policy and practice 
would not otherwise address. 
The section 2 of the revised Forest Policy 
2000 provisioned for pilot initiatives 
through Dutch-funded BISEP-ST project 
in eight Terai districts and DFID-funded 
Livelihoods and Forestry Programme 
in three districts. Major interest groups 
supporting CFM have been: some 
organisations (e.g., donors, INGOs, and 
NGOs), CFMGs, ACOFUN, forest 
bureaucrats, local government and distant 
users (including the Madhesi users, who 
live far from the forests). However, 
opponents, mainly CF activists, saw this 
policy merely as a tactic to consolidate 
government control over the revenue 
generated from the forests. They make 
the case that the CFs in Terai, which were 
handed over to communities before the 
state elaborated the CFM policy, are well 
protected and managed and are much better 
than under earlier government control, 
and are also in several cases benefitting 
the poorest groups. These arguments and 
counter-arguments with regard to Terai 
forestry policy, in due course, have been 
transformed from polarised conceptual 
debates to occasional field-level conflicts. 
As advocated by many CF activists, there 
are some practical challenges to translating 
and emulating the success of CF as 
practised in the hills into the Terai. Unlike 
the hills, the Terai did not have experience 
in collective action for common pool 
forest resource management, let alone a 
history of community forest management. 
Dhungana et al.
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Hence one fundamental challenge is to 
support the creation of new institutions 
of forest user groups. Larger forest sizes, 
recent settlements, heterogeneous social 
structure, problems in identifying and 
organising user groups, the existence 
of attractive timber markets nearby, 
together with widespread and organised 
illegal timber felling, all create additional 
obstacles to community management 
in this region (Satyal 2004). The equity 
concerns among proximate users (mainly 
the Pahadis) and distant users (mainly 
the Madhesis and Tharus) also present a 
complex and pressing issue.  
While neither CFM nor the CF regimes 
gathered real momentum in the Terai, 
Nepalese government brought CFM 
Directives in 2011 that provide procedures 
to allocate forests for CFM in the 
country. Besides providing guidelines 
for implementation of CFM in the 
Terai, it aims to address concerns of 
nearby and distant users for distribution 
of forest products, with a provision of 
benefits from productive forests to be 
distributed throughout the country, 
including urban populations and local 
and central governments. There are also 
other relevant policies that guide CFM 
implementation such as the Gender 
and Social Inclusion Policy 2008, which 
provide specific attention to gender 
equality and promotion of social inclusion 
in CBFM, including CFM. For example, 
the social inclusion process focuses on 
providing opportunities to the poor and 
marginalised groups for their participation 
in CBFM (REDD-IC 2016).
The Nepalese government brought a new 
Forestry Sector Strategy 2016 to provide 
strategic direction and guidance for the 
next decade, as the mandate of the Master 
Plan for the Forestry Sector ended in 
2011 (MoFSC 2015). This strategy aims to 
expand the scale of CBFM (including CF, 
CFM, buffer zones, and leasehold forestry) 
to cover 60 per cent of Nepal’s forest 
area by 2025. In particular, it envisions 
of covering 4 per cent of Nepal’s forest 
area under CFM by 2025 (from 0.9% 
coverage in 2015). Based on participatory 
land-use planning and identification 
of potential areas from District Forest 
Support Programmes, the Strategy aims 
to expand CFM in the residual blocks 
of national forests in the Terai and 
inner Terai. It also aims to undertake a 
comprehensive review with a view to 
reforming the CFM modality covering: 
decentralised and inclusive institutional 
structure, managerial and financial 
autonomy, transparent and accountable 
decision making, equitable benefit sharing 
(within the CFMG), benefit sharing from 
CFM between government (central and 
local) and local people, and technical 
aspects of forest management planning. 
Additionally, the Strategy aims to promote 
gender equity, inclusive development, 
and social and economic enhancement of 
the marginalised people, including poor, 
women, Dalits, and indigenous people 
in CBFM planning and implementation 
(MoFSC 2014).
Another policy document developed in 
line with the vision of the new Forestry 
Sector Strategy is the Forest Policy 2015. 
Among others, one of the characteristic 
features of the Forest Policy 2015 is its focus 
on equitable distribution of benefits from 
community and other forest governance 
arrangements (MoFSC 2015). It also 
focuses on institutional capacity building 
for promoting good governance, inclusion 
and social justice in the management. 
Similarly, the 2016 amendments to the 
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Forest Act 1993 provide legal basis for the 
recognition and implementation of CFM 
in the country. 
Dynamics of Ongoing Reform and 
Evolving Political Economy 
Amid latest reform initiatives and policy 
developments in the forestry sector, 
the success of CFM regime depends on 
whether there are sufficient provisions and 
mechanisms for participation of diverse 
actors in forest management decision-
making processes. More importantly, 
clarity of land tenure, ownership and use 
rights is vital, given the unclear provision 
of tenure security in CFM, particularly for 
user groups and local government (Jhaveri 
and Adhikari 2015). Hence, it is important 
to assure stronger and more secure tenure 
rights to the communities in all CBFM 
types and empower and safeguard tenure 
security for users of different kinds to 
access, manage, and use forest resources. 
Equitable sharing of benefits, resources 
and responsibilities between the local 
communities, local government and 
national government is also important. 
Reflecting the democratisation of the 
political processes as well as the forestry 
sector in recent years, CFM development 
and implementation seems to adopt a 
generally broad-based actor landscape, 
enabling the participation of different 
actors. Multi-stakeholder participation 
has increasingly become the norm, rather 
than exception, in forestry deliberations, 
including CFM debates and processes 
that provided an enabling environment 
for the CFM design and implementation. 
However, it is too early to judge the 
implications of these latest policy reforms 
and processes with regard to CFM, as it is 
still in its initial phase. Similarly, whether 
and how CFM addresses issues of tenure, 
governance and contestations at the local 
level is a difficult question, as there are 
several interrelated issues pertinent to 
access to and control over forest resources. 
Such issues might have been realised 
differently by different groups of people 
based on ethnicity, social grouping, 
economic status, political influence, 
habitation pattern, resource dependency 
and use pattern, physical location and 
power relations. 
CFM may continue to face contestations 
given that forest tenure and other aspects 
of forest people’s rights are debated 
in forest policy making. Additionally, 
ongoing contestations regarding the 
control over forest between the central 
government, local governments (including 
future federal states and local bodies), local 
community, and between communities, 
has also become politically charged in 
the recent years. Moreover, divided civil 
society and political parties, often taking 
opposed and polarising positions, have 
shown exclusionary tendency of actors 
themselves. There is also a considerable 
trust deficit between and within actors 
in government agencies, donor-funded 
projects, local NGOs, federations (and civil 
society organisations) as well as political 
parties that are involved at various degrees 
in decision making processes (Satyal 2017). 
The resolution of these challenges and 
contestations depends on the future course 
of Nepalese politics (including resolution 
of Madhesi agitation, federal restructuring 
and demarcation of states). 
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KEY ISSUES AND 
CHALLENGES IN CFM 
IMPLEMENTATION
Policy and Regulatory Issues
Key policy actors in the Terai forestry at 
the national level are: Ministry of Forests 
and Soil Conservation (MoFSC), Ministry 
of Local Development, FECOFUN, 
ACOFUN, forest contractors and their 
association, research institutions, and the 
judiciary. A major issue regarding policy 
formulation is a lack of coordination and 
trust between these stakeholders, which 
creates confusion and misunderstanding. 
There is also a lack of transparency and 
tendency of top-down approach at times, 
for example, government imposed ban 
on green felling and harvesting of certain 
species (e.g. Khair – Acacia catechu). This 
results in inconsistencies in policies, 
thereby creating confusions among 
different stakeholders regarding policy 
provisions and their interpretations (Bhatta 
et al. 2007). There are unclear provisions 
of tenure security in CFM, particularly 
for CFMGs and local governments. In 
addition, provision about the carbon 
rights is missing in CFM (MoFSC 2015). 
Other policy and regulation related issues 
at the national level include: unclear 
rights and responsibilities; inadequacy of 
rights definition (including ownership and 
usage rights); unpredictability of rights 
arrangements hampering tenure security; 
and limited consultative processes. There 
is also a lack of political will for genuine 
policy reforms. In fact, Niti (policy) vs 
Niyat (attitude) could be a useful analytical 
aspect of understanding CFM processes 
in Nepal. As Yadav et al. (2009) argue, 
even though the Niti is good, the Niyat of 
the implementer is not encouraging, and 
most often the tendency is to avoid rather 
than putting real efforts into management 
improvement. 
Social and Institutional Issues
There are some inherent social and 
institutional issues within existing CFM 
structures and processes. For example, 
CFM groups are often very large and 
heterogeneous; they also have weak social 
binding due to diversity (as compared to 
relatively homogeneous CFUGs).  CFM 
groups are mainly working with and 
linked to the DFO, their networking with 
other organisations and institutions at the 
national level is therefore weak. Similarly, 
at the local level, although different 
structures exist such as at the ward, VDC 
and CFM committee levels, these have 
not been fully institutionalised yet. Other 
social and institutional issues include: lack 
of adequate social mobilisation activities; 
limited awareness and perceptions on 
tenure among the stakeholders; lack of 
incentive for reform implementation 
(e.g. by DFO); and limited spaces and 
opportunities for participation (due to 
large number of members involved). Local 
level issues and challenges include: lengthy 
group formation process; inactive and 
non-functional committees at the ward 
and VDC levels; capacity deficit among 
the committee members and existence 
of discriminatory social structures. 
Furthermore, limited production of forest 
resources that is often insufficient to meet 
the need of the CFMG members have 
been one of the crucial factors creating 
additional misunderstanding in the 
distribution of resources/benefits among 
the users. 
Journal of Forest and Livelihood 15(1) September, 2017
38
Technical Issues 
There are technical issues related to 
management of high value forest resources 
(e.g. Sal – Shorea robusta) within the 
CFM regime. For example, DFO and 
CFMGs have expressed concerns over 
the availability of particular products 
(especially Shorea robusta) in some forests. 
Shorea robusta forests are vulnerable to 
degradation owing to improper silviculture 
practices (e.g. overuse, big gap in different 
age group or diameter class). In general, 
Terai forests have never been managed 
systematically or even according to basic 
sustainable forestry principles, despite the 
presence of enabling background condition 
such as access to road and market, and 
availability of productive land (Satyal 
2004, 2010). The attempts for active forest 
management in CFM are often ad hoc and 
erratic, and fail to realise the productive 
potential of the forest (Yadav et al. 2003). 
CFMGs have not been fully convinced of 
the importance of block-wise rotational 
forest management, particularly due to lack 
of proper forestry extension. As a result, 
there is a ‘passive blocking’, i.e. blocks 
have been divided on paper as per the 
requirement of CFM guidelines, without 
delineating real blocks in the forests. 
Management is limited to collection of 
dead, dying and fallen trees (Bampton et 
al. 2007). Most of the management plans 
are not based on silviculture system, 
which in turn limits the production and 
supply of forest products. Other issues 
and challenges include: lack of knowledge 
and skills on application of silviculture 
system among the CFM actors; challenges 
in preparation of technically sound 
management plan (e.g. with right balance 
among regeneration, tending and felling); 
weak technical capacity of CFMGs and 
DFOs for implementation of plan; and lack 
of technical support, financial investment 
and enabling environment.
Issues Related to Access, 
Supply and Distribution of Forest 
Products 
Following the establishment of CFM, 
only limited extraction is undertaken 
in order to allow regeneration in the 
initial years, especially where the forest 
is degraded. As the resource improves 
over time, product extraction levels can 
be increased, particularly from the forests 
where more active management is adopted. 
Prior to CFM, most households had been 
dissatisfied with the lack of effective 
controls on forest product extraction. 
Now the majority of households seem 
to be relatively satisfied with forest 
product distribution arrangement and also 
anticipate that the forest product could be 
better accessible institutionally. However, 
production and availability of forest 
products could be an issue. Moreover, 
there are some cases where timber and 
fuelwood are decaying in depot due to 
complicated auction and distribution 
systems. Due to lack of production of 
sufficient forest products, less numbers of 
forest users are benefiting. Particularly, 
the access and supply of timber to 
poorer households is an issue. This has 
also resulted in limited opportunities for 
community development and discouraged 
local people’s participation. Furthermore, 
the role of local government to the 
management of forest is also not clear, 
although they share benefits and income 
from CFM. Other issues include: lack 
of well-established supply and delivery 
system for forest product processing and 
distribution; forest products (e.g. logged 
timber) not meeting the needs of the local 
users; and lack of provision for selling 
sawn timbers in the CFMGs.
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Procedural and Bureaucratic 
Issues
A major challenge lies in integrating 
CFM policy and practice with democratic 
governance and livelihood imperatives 
(Kanel and Kandel 2004). As CFM 
is still in its initial stage of (wider) 
implementation, it requires effective 
administrative setup for operationalisation 
and institutionalisation of policies. The 
periodic change (generally a short rotation 
of time) of the key officials, particularly 
DFO, and CFMG executive members 
has limited the smooth functioning of 
CFM. There are not adequate systems to 
keep institutional memory and handover 
mechanism in these organisations. As the 
CFM activities are widening in both areas 
of forest management and community 
development, there are still outstanding 
issues of governance among the CFM 
institutions at the district and local level. 
Also, the institutional space for other actors 
such as NGOs, ACOFUN, consulting 
agencies and private sector organisations 
are limited, constraining the potential of 
these institutions in complementing or 
facilitating some of the procedural aspects 
of CFM implementation. 
Financial and Budgetary Issues
There are several activities in CFM (e.g. 
related to forest management such as 
regeneration, tending and felling; capacity 
building; and community development) 
that require funding. However, there is 
as such no system of allocating adequate 
annual budget according to plan, 
particularly by two main collaborators 
of CFM. While the central government 
allocated budget for CFM activities is not 
enough to implement planned activities, 
50 per cent of the financial resources 
received from the sale of forest products 
by the CFMG is not adequate either. Also, 
there is no explicit way to draw financial 
support from the local government. The 
forestry sector in the Terai region is 
financially constrained, despite the fact 
that sustainable harvesting of timber is 
estimated to potentially yield around US$ 
150 million annually (Hill 1999). Other 
associated issues include: complicated 
procedure of fund disbursement; 
inequitable proportion of investment; 
limited capital for investment in value 
addition; and inadequate budgetary 
support. 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
We argued that CFM regime was 
introduced without any clear legal 
backing and tenure arrangement but with 
an aim to address participation issue in 
government-managed forests in the Terai. 
The discussion around ‘collaborative’ 
mode of forest management emerged in 
Terai in the late 1990s, particularly in the 
aftermath of the failure of implementation 
of OFMPs. The idea was later synthesised 
as a concept for managing large blocks of 
Terai forests in the Revised Forest Policy 
of 2000. Later multiple reasons were put 
forward to justify the introduction of 
CFM, including but not limited to: the 
need for revenue generation from Terai 
forests, inability of the Department of 
Forest (DoF) to enforce government-
managed forests without community 
engagement, limitation of CFs in the given 
policy-legal framework to manage large 
chunks of forests and the need to address 
demand of population living away from 
forest frontier particularly in the down 
south (Bampton et al. 2007; Bhatta et al. 
2007; Satyal 2004, 2006, 2010; Sinha 2011; 
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Satyal and Humphreys 2013; Jhaveri and 
Adhikari 2015).  Experimenting CFM and 
debating around it for over one and a half 
decade, this forest management modality 
was finally included in the Forest Act in 
2016. We argued that CFM tenure regime 
is one of the series of state interventions 
in the broader political economy of Terai 
forests right from pre-formation of modern 
Nepal till date. The tenure arrangement in 
terms of bundle of rights is very complex, 
while there are also a number of policies, 
legal, social, institutional, technical, 
bureaucratic and financial issues around 
CFM regime. 
Despite the argument in favour of CFM 
as a ‘community-based’ regime, the tenure 
has been in a complex situation in terms 
of legal identity, authority assigned to 
CFMGs and local government, tenure 
enforcement mechanism and conflicts 
among the parties over decision making. 
Despite the inclusion of CFM in Forest 
Act, tenure identity of the regime is not as 
clear as other regimes, such as community, 
leasehold, religious or protected forests. 
In one hand, the regime is recognised as a 
separate tenure as CFM, while on the other, 
it is described as a ‘part of government-
managed forest’ (GoN 2016).  As per the 
legal provision, the management plan of 
the regime is prepared by the DFO and is 
approved by the DoF.  The implementation 
and management authority is assigned 
to the DFOs only, while the CFMGs 
and local governments are authorised as 
passive recipients of 50 per cent and 10 per 
cent benefits, respectively. CFM tenure 
regime was initially supposed to manage 
contiguous large blocks of forests in the 
Terai. However, as CFM users started 
working in a rights-based approach, such 
as collective lobbying for more share of 
the benefit sharing and meaningful space 
in decision making processes, the block 
forests are now meant to be managed solely 
by the government (or in partnership with 
private sector) in the 2016 amendment of 
Forest Act (e.g., GoN 2016). Therefore, 
among the three partners, the tenure right 
of user groups and local government over 
CFM is severely restricted with several 
limiting clauses. 
The ongoing federal restructuring process 
seems to complicate CFM most in 
comparison with other tenure regimes, 
since central and local governments are 
the two key parties out of the three 
in partnership equilibrium. When the 
proposed Provincial Governments are 
constituted, the structure of the CFM 
will be highly affected, so will the benefit 
sharing mechanisms. It is because another 
tier of the government will obviously 
emerge as a new powerful actor to claim 
its stake in the partnership.  It is also 
likely that the proposed stronger form of 
local government than the previous one 
(local entity) can bargain with a powerful 
position for more proportion of rights and 
responsibilities than other parties. 
We recommend the following tenure 
related reforms in CFM regime in terms of 
legal, institutional, technical and financial 
arrangements. 
•	 First, the CFM should be clearly 
recognised as a separate ‘partnership’ 
tenure regime or ‘community-based’ 
regime beyond the overarching 
framework of ‘government-managed’ 
forestry in forest laws. The current 
provision for CFM in Forest Act 
is ambiguous - seemingly it is a 
partnership model, but legally it is 
recognised as a part of government-
managed forest. Once it is clear, the 
likely complicating effects of federal 
restructuring would also be mitigated. 
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•	 Second, roles, responsibilities and 
authorities of CFMGs and the 
associated local governments should be 
clearly articulated and enforced since 
they are the ones who represent local 
communities and manage the regime 
in reality. Additionally, the rights of 
the CFMGs and local government to 
jointly participate in the preparation 
and implementation of CFM plans 
should be established. 
•	 Third, the technical skills and 
authority for forest management in 
the CFM should be rolled out to CFM 
groups from the current arrangement, 
where the DFO is recognised as the 
sole authority in deciding and applying 
silviculture systems in CFM.
•	 Finally, the cost and benefit sharing 
mechanisms in CFM should be revised 
in a way that more shares are allocated 
to CFMGs for institutional and 
financial sustainability of this tenure 
regime.   
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